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Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Europe:

A Reading Resource Pack

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Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Europe: A Reading Resource Pack

Introduction

The purpose of this resource pack is to provide a list of existing academic research on radicalisation and violent extremism in Europe for a wide range of stakeholders interested in studying, tackling this problematic issue. It brings up various sources from different disciplines in order to provide a tentative full picture of 'radicalisation studies. Neumann and Kleinmann argue that radicalisation never becomes a discipline a part, or a field of study. It attracts many transient researchers, academics, and policymakers but not complete dedication to the study (Neumann and Kleinman 2013). In their review, the authors argue that radicalisation research is systematically repetitive, and a vicious cycle is created between annotated second sources. In recent years, social science scholarship in diverse areas has contributed to the radicalisation research in order to understand the origins, network, sources, dynamics, and outcomes of it (Ranstrop 2010). However, radicalisation has been defined in very different ways and is often used in a vague manner (Neumann and Kleinmann 2013; Schmid 2013). Della Porta and LaFree demonstrated that there are multiple

definitions of radicalisation: a process leading toward the increased use of political violence; the use of physical force and conflict; an escalation process leading to violence (2008:4-10). Schmid finds that radicalisation is a very problematic concept (Schmid 2013:6). According to western security agencies, the main focus is given to the existing link between radicalisation and violence. It is first and foremost an adoption of extremist ideas and ideologies calling targeting liberal western values (AIVD 2006; PET 2008; RCMP 2009). Many researchers and policy analyst highlight this ill-defined manner as a source of problem suggesting that the term creates confusion about who is normal, moderate, mainstream, and radical (Sedgwick 2010). In this vagueness of the terminology, the point of reference depends on the context, the researcher, and the policies adopted by different stakeholders in order to tackle this phenomenon which is resulted by a fundamental disagreement about what constitutes radicalism. Thus, one may talk about the stagnation of radicalism studies because of the lack of evidence-based and data-driven studies in order to answer what and why questions. Most of the research is done on the existing sources and data coming from social media analysis, newspaper articles that constraint the advances in the field. The secondary sources create a certain perception and view in radicalism studies even though there exist no agreements on specific concepts and causes of radicalism. This has led to an explosion of studies, researches, funding that repeat the same sources and findings in various ways. Most of the studies and research programs focus on media analysis including social media platforms and communication channels, root causes (social and psychological grievances, identity crisis etc.), ideological motivations. While definitions of extremism and radicalisation have been offered by a range of researchers and policymakers, the multi-layered of root causes of extremism and radicalisation makes it difficult to offer a comprehensive and exhaustive definition of it. The complexity of

radicalism resides also in using the various terminologies. The vast literature on radicalisation provides a comprehensive view and definition on various concepts including some problematics (Borum 2011a; 2011b; Cross and Snow 2011; Kundnani 2015; Neumann 2013; Schmid 2013). Several concepts were invented and used by scholars: homegrown terrorism, radicalisation, violent extremism. Homegrown terrorism became widely used the term after the London attacks (Crone and Harrow 2011; Precht 2007). Remarking this multiplicity of this conceptual definition, in this resource pack uses the definition given by European Commission as "...a phased and complex process in which an individual or a group embraces a radical ideology or belief that accepts, uses or condones violence, including acts of terrorism...".[1] As underlined in many sources, the radicalisation is not a new phenomenon triggering a violent expression of ideology and belief, but it evolves during the last two decades and especially with the terrorist activities of Muslims in Europe turned the emphasis on 'jihadi violence' and Muslim extremism. The definition matters as it covers or excludes, changes, transforms our regard about it. Thus, academic research and studies facilitate the understanding of this phenomena by providing knowledge-based tools. A thick description of violent behaviours, ideology and social-political circumstances that favour the manifestation of radical ideologies linked with terrorism elucidate the concepts such as radicalism, violent extremism, violent radicalism, de-radicalisation and prevention concepts. A thick description coming from multi-disciplinary sources puts new added value in order to better explain the meanings of these concepts which evolve during the last decade. The first purpose of this publication is to enhance the utility of existing academic research on radicalisation in Europe.

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/radicalisation_en access date 3 February 2020.

In addition to the academic resources, practice-oriented programs developed at the grassroots level aiming to find the best solutions to the radicalisation problem. Theses policy-oriented papers and findings add a new dimension of non-coherence, superficial findings to the 'field'. The problems aforementioned in previous articles such as non-consistency, superficiality, being secondary, non-rigorous, methodological and empirical inadequacy, create some challenges for researchers and stakeholders to propose adequate solutions to the problem.

The main focus of this resource pack has twofold. On the one hand, this reading resource pack analyses the thematic overview of academic research on radicalisation published as reports, books, chapters and peer-reviewed articles in the last ten years, between 2010 and 2020. This booklet sheds light on the wide range of research produced in English. Furthermore, it includes also some most cited policy papers and works written in local languages. In doing so, this work package aims to give an idea about the existing studies in order to grasp what is underlined and needed around this topic. It is possible also that this work package shows us what kind of contributions can be made and draw attention to new trends and developments in extremism. On the other hand, this work aims to give some practical tools for a wide range of stakeholders interested in challenging this issue by providing some examples and practices developed by local communities and organisations in Europe. Following the same logic of indexing academic researches on radicalisation, providing the existing policies and concrete projects on radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, we aim to give an insight and shorthand feedbacks that help community organisers to expand their participation in these debates and discussions and to establish a sustainable community lens and framework for the synthesis of de-radicalisation and counter-extremism initiatives in Europe. The suggest of solutions coming from

grassroots level practices extend, elucidate and challenge also the academic researches that document and frame the knowledge on radicalisation and violent extremism. The categorization of these community practices and their results present at a certain extent to evaluate also the existing mechanisms and measures in tackling radicalisation.

In each theme, this publication gives the main findings coming out from the cited works with annotated information. These cited academic works are selected from international journals, books, and proceedings under various criteria such as being frequently cited, providing critical and recent perspective. Although our selection coverage is clearly extensive, but not comprehensive. This classification includes practices encountering radicalisation and violent extremism in Europe. In this work package, we suggest this reading resource pack be used as a companion resource for training on the study of radicalisation in order to develop appropriate measures to counter it. The methodology of this paper is mainly a literature review with references to widely referred sources on various issues related with extremism and radicalisation including policy-oriented projects, conceptualisation issues, root causes of radicalism and definition of concepts. There is a strong emphasis on jihadism and jihadi radicalisation.

As part of the Extremely EUnited project, this resource pack identifies academic and policy-oriented publications to provide some tools to the better comprehension of the phenomena. It catalogues citations and researches under main themes: Theorising Field (social movement theories and networks), De-radicalisation and Prevention, Digital and Conventional-Social Media, Foreign Fighters, Foreign Policy and Radicalisation, Gender Perspective, Ideology, Narratives and Counter-Narratives, Psychological Grievances, Root Causes,

Prisons, Recruitment and Mobilisation. In each theme, this publication gives the main findings coming out from the cited works. These cited academic works are selected from international journals, books, and proceedings under various criteria such as being frequently cited, providing critical and recent perspective, data-based research, novelty. Although our selection coverage is clearly extensive, but not comprehensive. In this work package, we suggest this reading resource pack to be used as a companion resource for training on the study of radicalisation in order to develop appropriate measures to counter it.

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1- Theorizing Field

- Since 9/11 terrorist studies regarding radicalism and extremism in link with jihadism have mushroomed. Recent articles and studies show that core

epistemological and methodological problems persist in a discussion of radicalisation, extremism.

- The literature of social movement theories contributes to the lack of generalizable theory and methodology of radicalism by bringing a necessary conceptual framework for understanding the phenomena. The social movement theories are used in explaining the radicalism phenomenon as a linear or non-linear process in which many social political and religious dynamics that trigger of becoming radical.
- Many studies explain the process of radicalisation in referring to different subsequent stages, however, others suggest that non-linear subsequent mechanism cannot explore the whole picture of radicalisation as the lone wolves.

The lack of theoretical and conceptual generalization tools represents one of the main problems in radicalisation field. In this sense, in following the major debates, this part will present below the aim of identifying some of the theoretical conceptualisations and conceptual hindrances in the field. The term of radicalisation has its origin in the field of social movement theories, for example, in their earlier research (della Porta and la Free 2012, 6) the term of radicalisation is emerged in the context of social movements of the 60s and 70s, however, as Malthaner (2017) notes that the term takes a shift to more violent forms of action in a broader sense especially in terrorism studies (Crenshaw 1995). It becomes later "radicalisation studies" implying its own field and jargon after 9/11. By the mid of 2000, the field has been emboldened and expanded particularly to the violence in jihadism in the West looking at specific patterns of Islamic militancy, recruitment mechanisms and narratives (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Nesser 2009; Neumann and Rogers 2008; Sageman 2004;

2008; Silber and Bhatt 2007; Taarnby 2005,), according to Malthaner, which form the main focus of the research in radicalisation.

The first major fault lines are that radicalisation refers to a non-linear process of becoming more vulnerable and radical (Ainine et all. 2016; Alimi et all. 2012). The term becoming radical includes many social political and religious dynamics that trigger this process. In this sense, the question is to see the starting and end-point process of radicalisation which links to the nature and root causes of the problem. Thus, the question of the process is more complex as it includes not only a sequence of happenings but encompasses a change and transforming into a particular attitude (Alimi and all 2012, Bosi, Demetriou and Malthaner 2014), belief, adoption of extremist ideology and violence. This process may include various sub-processes, groups, actors, movements. It can be conceived as a process of mobilization of a group of people, ideas, for example, emerging of violent social movements. The factors at the micro (individual), meso (group) and macro (society) level can play a role in this process of radicalisation (Doosje et all, 2016). Considering radicalism as a process, some scholars and works use social mobilization theories and their methodological approaches.

The second emerging research frontier is linked to the social movement theories (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Van Stekelenburg 2014). The increasing number of researches concentrating on violent social groups use social movement and mobilization theories in order to understand why individuals join such groups and why they choose violent, radical means to express their causes and motivations barrow the methodologies and concepts from social movement paradigm. The literature of social movement theories contributes to the lack of generalizable theory and methodology of radicalism by bringing a necessary

conceptual framework for understanding the phenomena. Firstly, the social movement paradigm as developed in various sources such as Della Porta, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow's studies, build the fundamental argumentation of radicalization as it is considered a kind of contentious politics. Social movements stress the nature of contentious politics (Tarrow 1998). In this view, the challenges, actions form a part of contention. The contentious politics sees social movement and their mobilisation in a long-term process with sequential events encompassing various actors, tactics, and methods. Violent radicalism gave that it makes political claims and seeks to establish its political and social order can be considered as contentious politics. Secondly, the identity and ideological components of social movements are emphasised in forming collective identities and action in groups like ISIS. ISIS uses media outlets and internet aiming to form a distinctive group identity with the mobilisation of resources (Sardarnia, & Safizadeh 2019). Wiktorowicz's studies exemplify this trend of explanation Muslim radicalization through social movement theories. Referring to social movement theories, Wiktorowicz (2005) defined a four-stage model of radicalization in the case of al-Muhajiroun, a militant Salafi jihadist group based in the United Kingdom. The cognitive opening to new people is the first step as a consequence of personal or group grievances. Second, personal relations with activities such as kinship and friendship connections are developed. Third, the participant in this group accepts the authority of the group leader for religious issues. The last step consists of the idea of salvation depending on jihadi activism. In line with this categorisation, Silber and Bhatt identify four stages: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization (2007: 6-7). Another report underlies the radicalism as a process that consists of four consecutive phases: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, jihadization (Silber and Bhatt 2007). In this process, the identification with a

meta-narrative which is very extreme, radical, and violent such as jihadism entails the main factor of explaining how people choose a violent path.

The methodological debates within the study of social mobilization theories and movements are relevant for research on radicalism. In the context of social movements and violence, this literature gives to radicalization researches a distinct approach (Malthaner, Bosi, Demetriou, 2014). The main focal point of these researches is that the individuals participate in protests and demonstrations via collective action to foster their claims and to express their legitimacy. He also underlies the cultural aspect of Islamic militancy as a kind of collective identity that sustains the Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. Thirdly, the social movement's approach focuses on recruitment strategies. The social movement and mobilization theories influence considerably mainstream research on radicalization such as the role of pre-existing networks and personal ties, the organizational structures (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006). In this vein, Sageman's works (2004; 2008; 2016; 2017) demonstrate well how jihadi mind people move within existing jihadi networks. They combine historical and empirical approach, based on interviews with neo-jihadists incarcerated in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Sageman first describes terrorists driven by family and close friendly ties. For him, more than 70% of al-Qaida members have participated in the organisation via friendly links (Sageman 2004: 13). Following the same classification and methodology used by Sageman, Edwin Bakker found many similarities in European jihadist networks (2006:52).

He also underlies the serious lack of methodological approach in the use of the concept of radicalisation. His studies and research focus on the existing jihadi networks' triggering effects of new radicalisation waves. In the study of

radicalism, ideological and personal grievances continue to play a central dynamic and push factor in explaining the emergence of violent extremist groups. The violent groups and movements tap into the personal grievances for their ideological stance by strengthening the morality of the individuals who are motivated by idealized doctrine in contradiction to society's practice. In this sense, the radicalisation researches address the grievances to explain the emergence of violent groups even though grievances are not alone the only dynamics in individuals' joining violent movements. Supporting to the role of grievances, researchers benefit from resource mobilization perspective that proposes the necessary material resources for supporters and sustained collective action. For groups like ISIS, it is high-cost participation like suicide bombings, and it requires more resources to be canalised similar to social movements. Al-Qaeda, ISIS seems to be structured like social movement organisations in their resource mobilisation, managing strategies, distributing goods. The resource mobilisation methodologies and approaches are relevant for research on radicalism. The last point borrowed from social movement theories forms the community-building aspect in violent and radical groups. Cultural perspectives have been introduced in new social movement theory to identify the role of culture in the context of mobilisation dynamics. Sutton and Vertigans (2006) argue that radical Islamist movements stress on the creation of an identity that allows for a narrow down motivation based of participants. In this community-building process, the efforts are given to emotional commitments in collective action (Goodwin et all. 2001) acquire more attention in radicalism research (Van Stekelenburg 2017). Emotions may be transformed into hatred and violent messages. The implication of emotional transformation in social movement and violence is combined with psychological studies highlighting psychological factors of radicalism which will be explored in previous sections in this study.

Consideration of the radicalism that can be one outcome of contentious politics, is also relevant in social movements (della Porta 1995; Tarrow 1989).

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2- Foreign Policy

- The jihadis justify their terrorist attack referring to the western presence and foreign policy in Muslim majority countries, but the link between foreign policy and domestic terror attacks indicates a weak correlation in cases of jihadi attacks in Europe.
- It is not very clear about the role of foreign policy in increasing terrorism and violent radicalisation. There is a need for more studies in order to understand how foreign policy and occupation generate local domestic violence.
- The ideological drivers such as seeing the West as an enemy predominate the motivation of domestic terrorist attacks.

The local context determines the radicalisation (Coolsaet 2016) at the same time the radicalism is connected to global and the transnational changes, events, and atmosphere. Some scholars argue that the foreign policy (the Iraq war, Israel-Palestinian conflict, regional conflicts) have an impact on domestic radicalisation (Wilkinson and Gregory 2005, Harrow 2010). Robert Pape (2006) argues that there exists a correlation between foreign occupation and suicide attacks that can be motivated by the presence of a foreign army on national soil. Kenneth Pollack defends the idea that Iraq became a central front in the war on jihadi terrorism before US troops arrived.[2] The invasion of Iraq gave re-birth of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq and increase the terrorist activities.[3] These points of view are restricted to the expansion of Islamic jihadism in Iraq but did not explain how the invasion fuelled

[2] https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/impact-of-iraq-war-on-jihadist-terrorism/
[3] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-and-the-global-war-on-terrorism/

domestic terrorism. The link between foreign policy and domestic terror attacks also indicates some strong points in cases of jihadi mobilisation in Europe. The Salafi jihadi presence and acts targeting Italian interests due to the Italian support in Iraq reveal the relevancy of this argument (Björkman 2010). Since the end of the 70's, jihadism has been taken new faces. The Afghan mujahedeen's struggle against soviet invasion in 1979, the emergence of al-Qaeda and the global jihadism, the local national-religious fights in various local contexts with domestic jihad and lastly the appearance of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria exemplify the transformation and change of jihadi militantism. Subsequently, a different generation of jihadist emerged in Muslim majority and minority countries. According to the argument defending the correlation between the country's foreign policy and domestic terrorism, the domestic jihadis attack because of action or inaction by the West at Muslim countries. Britain's presence in Iraq, French military activities in sub-Saharan Africa have highlighted during the domestic terror attacks in Britain and France. Within these lines, the link between active military involvement and domestic terrorism is very simple and not very deep. The jihadi people who participated in armed struggle and violence, they see in any case the West or anyone who does not share the same belief and ideology as an enemy. There are also hundreds of Muslims who are the victim of jihadis. Thus, it is not very clear how western foreign policy and military activities fuel jihadism.

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3- Digital and Conventional-Social Media

- The researchers are very divided on the Internet's role in radicalisation and violence, but it is considered as a facilitator in the path of radicalism.
- According to the recent studies, the online platforms shift the methodology, discourse, narrative and structure of the terrorist groups in terms of mobilisation, recruitment and defining strategies.
- The radical violent online activities create another 'real world' with anonymity, swiftness, glamour, and catchy content. To address the online radicalism, it is indispensable the collaboration of public and private organisation to develop convincing responses.

As with many issues in the debate on radicalisation, there is also non-agreement on online radicalisation and how it happens. What does media play exactly in the radicalisation and how do we measure it? What is the influence of online interactions in producing violence? The discussion did not start with the radicalisation as the online violent groups invest the web in order to convey their messages; however, with the jihadi attacks, the online radicalism and terrorism turn into a new phenomenon. The discussion illustrates how the so-called *jihadisphere* (Conway 2012; Ducol 2012) receives an imminent place in the research of radicalisation by studying the various types of online violent ideologies, the diversity of platforms, social media channels, the online countermeasures developed by the government, private companies (Alava et all. 2017). The Internet provides an operational functionality to the messages, new forum for discourse, an instrument that amplifies the circulation of violence. Thus, the Internet facilitates the affected social interactions in various forms; static websites, online

games, social media platforms, extremist forms (Zelin 2013). With using modern media apparatus and the possible online interactions, the jihadist propaganda and discourse find a place, channel to disseminate its messages, especially with the social media platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Instagram, Telegram among western jihadis (Berger and Hon 2015; Bloom et all 2019; Carter et all 201; Klausen 2015). The social media shift the warfare frontlines and significantly define the jihadists' operational strategies (Klausen 2015) The social media platforms, according to some researchers, extend the radical mobilisation and recruitment process as functional as real-life connexions. Every single platform is used for various purposes. For example, Weimann highlights the Facebook groups that let terrorists find Muslim youth searching for information on Islam (Weimann 2014). While Twitter becomes the main channel of dissemination with targeting and orienting different kind of content (Fisher and Prucha 2013), YouTube creates a community with a subculture (Weimann 2014) allowing comments, exchange comments about videos etc. The other platforms such as Instagram and Flickr create an imagined world with jihadi figures, revolutionary scenes. Telegram is new warfare and constitutes a significant tool to create a direct relationship between IS's central organisation and its supporters (Krona 2020).

The profound connectivity turning around interactions involving places, people, events allows groups to create their own story and to frame what happens by disseminating inflammatory images (Awan, Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2011). Jihadi violent Internet forums and websites allow also to recruit, to meet other young people who are willing to join and involve in creating the 'alternative' frames and images like showing battle scenes, fights, city captures, beheadings (Herfroy-Mischler and Barr 2019; Hughes and Vidino 2015) like in ISIS Dabiq magazine.

They create narratives such as martyrdom, hijra (migration) based on real stories of 'mujahedeen' (Toguslu 2018). These platforms and message channels show young people how to become a killer and how they can fight for Islam against the non-Muslims or a heretic. A look at how foreign fighters were attracted to join in the Syrian war by ISIS reveals the importance of the Internet, virtual jihadism based on the content of certain ideas, exchange of views that inspire to commit violence. Another issue related to the role of the Internet in radicalisation is recruitment online. For example, in the case of al-Qaeda, the radicaliser and leadership pay enormous attention to the communicative potential of the Internet and use its power for tactical operations, disseminating its global-local strategies, fundraising and also recruiting new people (Weimann 2014). For today's jihadis, the social media takes the place of conventional media and conveys the message, glorifies the propaganda, informs the mission, campaigns for donations. Taking this idea of the Internet to replace the physical spaces, it is the new 'radical mosque' and a new worship centre (Winter 2015:7; Weimann 2014:2). Sageman contends that the Internet assists the creation of virtual networks and friendships in developing tactics and defining recruitment strategies (2008:144). The terrorist organisations use the Internet for the purpose to recruit and radicalise through gathering and coordinating of individuals vulnerable to radicalisation (Torok 2013). Thus, it is not only the messenger (radical online preacher, a charismatic figure etc.) that plays a role in conveying the message but at the same time, the condition of readiness of receiver is also important as the audience must be an active participant in the message transfer (Aly 2009:2, Archetti 2015:50; Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen 2016). The so-called self-radicalisation is realized via the Internet and some scholars accept self-radicalisation as Internet radicalisation (Behr et al 2013). In this view, the Internet has the potential to radicalise an individual.

The studies overemphasising the role of the Internet in radicalisation are not supported by the existence of empirical data. It remains unclear how the Internet radicalises the people. In this regard, the Web's role is questioned in violence and radicalisation process. Zelin remarks that the studies on online radicalisation remain highly descriptive and not empirical (Zelin 2013). The correlation between Internet usage and terrorist attacks lacks evidence from empirical studies (Benson 2014; Gill et al. 2015, Conway 2017). They criticise the causality link between violence and the Internet's role. The Internet is a multifaceted medium that provides various communication channels. It facilitates the establishment of networks, the information, the announcement. According to Gill et, all (2014:430) 35% of 119 lone actor terrorists use the Internet to interact with other activists, 46% of them use for didactic purposes. The Internet, especially the social media is the place where you are owner the information, you can create the content, which is the originality of social media, however, there is no data how social media radicalise people, form a terrorist organisation. It may be a facilitator of formation of a terrorist network, but not the cause. The Internet and social media prompt the jihadis revolutionaries images, visualise their existence and make visible them, but again the constitution of terrorist cells, groups and networks by the Internet is very speculative, While Internet facilitates the creation of various platforms, the exchange of ideas, the enormous amount of information, it does not offer a framework that is provided by a credible and charismatic figure (Nesser 2009).

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4- Gender Dimension

- As there exist many prototypes of female jihadist, it is hard to explain the motivations of Muslim females in joining ISIS.
- Ideological and emotional affections contribute to women's participation in radical organisations, especially in ISIS.
- Women's role is not secondary in radical jihadist organisations but fits well with the message virtuous Muslim society and family with the dignity that radical organisations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS would like to convey.

Women's radicalization is a minority phenomenon, it remains a smaller group in Muslim extremist groups even it is restricted in Salafi jihadi groups (Bloom 2013). The Black Widows of Chechens, Lebanese and Palestinian activists (André-Dessornes 2013), al Qaeda suicide bombers, suicide bombers of Kurdish Worker's Party, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade female bombers and also western converts like Belgian Muriel Degauque, Colleen LaRose (Halverson 2012), Samantha Louise Lewthwaite who became suicide killers are some examples from female radical organisations and persons. Bloom discusses also the ideological and strategic shift within terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda (2013, 2011). Several studies analyse the link between terrorism and gender (Bloom 2011) and nowadays the literature is focusing on jihadist movement, however, the scale of studies remain very small vis-a-vis general debate on radicalism. The implication of women in terrorist activities and violence with the arrival of ISIS remarks also new studies that understand why they join Syrian rebels and what is their role in jihadism (Bakker and de Leede 2015; Benslama and Khosrokhavar 2017; Bradford et all 2015; Kneip 2016; Pierret and Cheikh 2016; Saltman and Smith 2016). The growing

number of young Muslims joined in ISIS, an estimated 10 per cent of foreign recruits from Europe were women (Cook and Vale 2018). Among these women, there exist also very young girls, new married women and young families. The EU nationalities of the woman in ISIS's ranks raise concerns related to their return or mobilise for other terrorist activities. There is no predominant stereotype among these women in ISIS. Most of the girls are coming from religious families, some of them have a good education, others are very naïve (Bakker and de Leede 2015).

The al-Qaida and ISIS networks give attention to the participation of Muslim women in their violence. The online radical websites target specifically woman aiming to recruit them for their objectives and strengthen the ties that exist within the radical terrorist groups. In this vein, Al-Khansa was launched in 2004 by al-Qaeda offshoot groups in Saudi Arabia. In 2010, they release another online women's magazine, Al Shamikah (The Majestic) that distributes any women magazine-style stories on working on households' duties, Islamic responsibility and calling to violent action, sharing stories from wives of suicide bombers. ISIS creates an online sisterhood of female ISIS supporters' network that allows its members to share ideas about travelling to Syria, fundraising for members who have lost their husbands in ISIS. Other social media platforms were activated by ISIS female supporters in order to spread the jihadist contents, ideas (Carvalho 2014). The case of Choudhry who stabbed a British MP demonstrates that the violent Jihad does not particularly belong to the male domain (Pearson 2015:16). She identifies herself as a British Muslim woman who has a responsibility to represent her religion as men do and making jihad. Her attack does not indicate brainwashing or docile agents' action, rather from a gender perspective it may be read as a conscious engagement that entangles female agency. The motivation of

the women depends also on their educational, social, and religious background as there are multiple typologies. For example, previous examples of women suicide bombers belonging to various organisations are motivated by secular nationalist, Islamist, and jihadi ideologies. According to Benslama and Khosrokhavar and, for the most female jihadis, the desire to avenge the death for a close family member is one of the main reasons (Benslama and Khosrokhavar 2017) and they experience humiliation after the imprisonment of their men. They want to be also a martyr to show their self-commitment for the Islamic cause. Is there a difference between men and women in terms of motivations? According to a few pieces of research, men and women participate in violent jihadi activities and networks for the same reasons and motivations. An example of research analysing the social media accounts of ISIS women highlights that they cite the oppression of Muslims, the specific grievances, and social fractures (Hoyle et all 10-14; Moaveni 2019). The ideological and religious premises prevail other motivations and reasons as seen in men. For example, they want to a pure life according to Islamic rules, the idea of a fresh start with supporting ISIS cause and goals, breaking with un-Islamic lifestyle stimulate women's desire to join ISIS as well as men. In this sense, the gender difference is not very essential and crucial in understanding the ISIS motivations and reasons in violence, however, in the same studies what we understand that the women attach emotionally more and more to the religious duties, responsibilities. For those women who frustrated with the despairing atmosphere (whatever it is), the ISIS vision echoes well what they want to aspire. Moaveni depicts the stories of some ISIS women how they reached and made their way to ISIS to achieve dignity and freedom that ended up with armed struggle and violence, and another frustration (2019). To find a heroic life with a heroic man brings many young women to Syria. It is not only a romance or glamour in jihad, at the same time many ISIS women

considers marrying a religious duty and seeking more puritanic way of life with marriage (Navest et all 2016) and self-accomplishment (Pierret and Cheikh 2015). In addition to the religious side, marrying with a jihadi increase their statute as their husband dies in the battlefield thus, they will be perceived as not a widow but martyr's wife. The religious, emotional and ideological convictions nest in ISIS ideology and territorial caliphate project (Peresin and Cervone 2015). The driver factors vary regarding western women and girls in supporting ISIS jihadi activities. Briefly, the existing research does not make a gender distinction taking into account social, economic and religious root causes in order to explain the attractiveness of ISIS ideology: uncertain about their place in western society, discrimination and alienation, the oppression of Muslim population, searching dignity, an idealised Islamic lifestyle, frustration over Muslim communities sufferings, negative attitudes towards Muslims in the West, building Caliphate, romanticised image of jihad, religious duty such as doing hijrah or jihad (Bradfort et all 2015; RAN 2018).

Another dimension in the gender approach of radicalism is the role of women in de-radicalisation process and programs. According to RAN report (2019), the crucial contribution of Muslim women in depicting, determining the workable prevention measures and initiatives should be included in de-radicalisation and disengagement programs. Recent studies focus on how Muslim female may take part a role in countering violent extremism (OSCE 2013; OSCE 2019, Pearson et all 2020; Brown 2020).

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5- Narratives and Counter-Narratives

- Concerning counter-narratives against these meta-narratives, a rigorous analytical framework through which the success and failures of counter-narratives can be examined.
- Disseminating the counter-narratives to echo chamber and measure their effectiveness remains as an issue to be solved.
- The narratives and counter-narratives are the visible sides of an iceberg, they become operational and effective unless taking into account the root causes.
- There is a need for guidelines to develop the counter-narratives that should be small scale, community-based and practice-oriented.

During the last decade, the role of narrative is examined in terrorism and criminal studies. The aim is to help to understand how narratives can contribute to the emergence of violence and jihadi extremist ideologies. In this respect, Halverson et all. co-authored book 'Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism' gives many insights about the general over emphasised narratives that can be found in many Muslim communities including the violent ones (2011). The narratives are driven from Islamic sacred texts and history representing moral teachings, values, and moments of Muslim tradition. Narratives represent an event, or a series of events consist of stories, symbols, signs that convey a certain meaning and content to an audience. Narratives create a sense of coherence, a trajectory, and a safe and comfortable place. By organizing the world around, them based on coherent narratives rooted incredible sources, they construct preferred ways of life. This makes sense of the events of everyday life and connects these events to existing information and justifying daily actions. Jihadi radical organisations routinely and systematically use narratives to justify, recruit, sustain, endure and give meaning to their actions by delivering in various formats such as text, speech, images, pictures, magazines, social media platforms (Gendron 2016; Rudner 2016). They share stories from the Islamic past and make the connection today's events aiming to enhance their just moral position. The studies exploring jihadist narratives emphasize on what is narrated in order to understand the logic and arguments developed. Mostly these studies use textual analysis as data such as online social media messages, jihadi magazines (Toguslu 2018,...) these studies analyse the questions of how narratives are constructed, who are the characters and how these narratives become operational. Research on jihadist narratives has focused on the messages, key terminologies used by organisations and their members. The narratives can be understood as

"background contributing factors that lead to and catalyse the radicalisation of EU citizens" (Korteweg et all. 2010).

Another challenge that stakeholders and policymakers face when developing an accurate counter-narrative is the multiplicity of narratives, meta-narratives and sub narratives used by different jihadi groups. These narratives revolve around some common thematic like western aggression against Muslims, apocalypse, the obligation of jihad, apostate regimes, *hijrah* (migration), the dignity of Muslims (Fink & Sugg 2015). Some of the narratives are extensively used by jihadis movements like a war against Islam (Al-Raffie 2012; Leuprecht et al. 2009; Holtmann 2013). The jihadi organisations draw their core narrative from this theme of West as an enemy in order to legitimate their jihad by citing events and examples such as the invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, the Srebrenica genocide, Iraq invasion and the presence of local oppressors (apostate regimes). Jihad is revealed to be the ultimate mean to struggle with the enemy that includes infidels and those who support them (Fink and Sugg 2015).

Thirdly, all elements in the meta-narratives do not consist of violent components. For example, the narrative of jihad does not end always with violence, it contains also romantic elements. Romanticising the battlefields, a picture of warrior smiling, or loving animals try to give an image that spurs violence in jihadi organisations. The stories shared by jihadi organisations create a subcultural style like "jihadi cool" or "men in black of Islamic State" (Cottee 2011). This jihadi cool is amplified with *nasheeds* (Said 2012), musical styles referencing and glorifying the jihadi narratives, the idea is to construct an image of pure Caliphate, an idealised life. "The caliphate is the solution and pure" and "you are living in paradise" rhetoric finds its place non-military practices in jihadi groups (Hegghammer 2017). Hegghammer's edited book sheds light how jihadis use an

aesthetic culture (Crone 2014), poetry (Creswell and Haykel 2017; Holtman 2013a; Kendall 2015), dreams (Edgar 2011; Edgar and de Looijer 2017), music (Gråtrud 2016; Lahoud 2017; Lemieux and Nill 2011; Pieslak 2017), symbols (Holtmann 2013b), visual images and videos (Farwell 2010; Ostovar 2017; Stenersen 2017; Weisburd 2009 which are essential for understanding their mindset and narratives. The narratives are not only about ideas and ideology, but they are also embedded with social and cultural assets of the organisations, their milieu and religious context. One may talk about the counterculture (Sageman 2011: 119) created by Salafi jihadist milieus as Dantschke discusses the development of Salafi jihadism in Germany with pop jihad among jihadi youth culture (2014). These aesthetic assemblages (Crone 2014) supports the influence of narratives in various ways: recruitment, emotional commitment, community building, conveying a powerful message and image of an organisation. The cultural side of narratives creates another challenge to the researchers to make a distinction between jihadi mind and non-violent one.

In order to tackle with extremist narratives, counter-narratives are suggested to prevent violence and terrorism and discredit the ideologies and actions of terrorist groups, however, like the definition of radicalisation counter-narrative includes wide range activities with different strategies, aims, policies and communication plans (Briggs and Feve 2013:i). Braddock and Horgan define the narratives as "any cohesive and coherent account of events with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end about characters engaged in actions that result in questions or conflicts for which answers or resolutions are provided" (Braddock & Horgan 2016:383). And the counter-narratives are " designed to contradict terrorist propaganda and discourage support for terrorism...constructed by identifying and quantifying the most pernicious themes in the terrorist narratives, and targeting them by revealing the incongruities and contradictions

in their coherence, or by disrupting "analogies that equate aspects of the narrative to real-world events" (Braddock & Horgan, 2016:388).

Many studies also question the effectiveness of counter-narratives. In his work on ISIS propaganda, Winter outlines the complexity of motivation and objectives of narratives used in their media machine that underpins the ISIS' deployment of the message (2015). He criticises the lack of deep understanding of ISIS message and its variety with different narratives in place. He argues that a catch-all single counter-narrative will not be very productive (Winter 2015:8) and defends that the whole information architecture should be documented in order to develop a suitable strategy against ISIS mind organisations. In line with this argument, others underly the necessity of understanding the main elements the theological justifications of jihadi ideology in order to counter the radical and extremist narratives (Al Raffie 2012; Briggs 2011; Briggs and Feve 2013; Hussain & Saltman 2014; Aly et al. 2014). One of the challenging points of counter-narratives is to answer a variety of radical jihadi narratives that may prioritise different objectives depending on local contexts. Al Raffie argues that the focus should be given to searching common elements in these various Jihadi narratives that form a master narrative and examine (Al Raffie 2012); however searching the common elements in Islamist and Muslim organisations create another problematic issue related with freedoms, liberties and demonising all Muslim communities who share the same narratives in different contexts without violence. Depicting the master narratives of jihadi organisations may not be evolved adequately in line with the diversity of usage of these narratives and how these deployed narratives influence individuals and motivate them to commit violent actions. Concerning counter-narratives against these meta-narratives, thus, a rigorous analytical framework through which the success and failures of counter-narratives can be

examined. As a consequence of this lack of analytical framework, governments' counter-narrative strategies fall short to respond to the problem. For example, most of the initiatives and programs focus on messaging; circulating the right messages or removing harmful discourses on the internet, however, the online counter-narratives do not take into account the social and political root causes, the influence of friendly networks, and the social environment. In addition to the social environment and networks, how a message will reach to the echo chambers of radicalized and jihadist people and how to solve the problem of living inside the echo chamber.

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6- Psychological Grievances

- Studies on radicalisation underly the lack of empirical evidence of existing psychological prototype of a radical personality as multiple radical typologies, while other studies suggest that extremism is defined as deviance from general behavioural norms in which a motivational imbalance exist and dominate the other human needs.
- The studies overemphasise on an idea that violent extremists share a specific mind and psychology. According to these studies, terrorists distinguish themselves psychologically from the general population and they have a specific mindset.

Another approach contributed to the understanding of individual trajectories towards radicalism and violent extremism is the possible psychological grievances leading to violence. Is there a type of radical personality? Studies on radicalisation underly the lack of empirical evidence of existing psychological prototype of a radical personality as multiple radical typologies (Horgan 2005) are found in various data sets. Borum (2014), Horgan (2005, 2008a), Silke (2008) explain the meta sources of radicalism and give attention to the social and economic drivers that make individuals vulnerable to radicalisation. Silke (1998) explains that the link between psychopathology and terrorism remains very vague and the evidence is very weak after his review of the literature suggesting terrorists suffer from the psychopathological disorder. Horgan has criticised also psychological approaches (2016).

In opposition to these critics on the link between psychological disorder and terrorism, other suggest that extremism is defined as deviance from general behavioural norms in which a motivational imbalance exist and dominate the other human needs (Ginges et all 2011; Hogg et all 2013; Kruglanski et all 2017; Kruglanski et all 2018). Others also suggest that the loss of personal significance such as humiliation, feeling ashamed, the desire of a positive image and sense of uncertainty fuels extremism. As consequence individuals seek strategies to restore the personal self-confidence (Webber et all 2018). Even though most of the radicalism researchers acknowledge the multi-layered social and economic root causes of the phenomenon, there remains a perception that violent extremists share a specific mind and psychology. Pearlstein (1991) distinguishes terrorists psychologically from the general population and argues that they have a specific mind in committing violent activities. They are motivated by personality disorders such as narcissism or paranoia. In this regard, violent radicalism is a result of psychopathology. In other terms, personal identity and disorders are more important than group identity and commitment. The researches focused on psychopathological grievances underly that narcissistic people tend to violence in order to satisfy their certain needs by joining underground groups. They interact with the same mind people, rival groups, the government as a consequence a group identification process. Thus, the psychological attitudes and grievances are reinforced in interactive and dynamic relations of a violent group. Individual's personal situation, personal crisis (Sageman 2004:95; Silber and Bhatt 2007:7, Wiktorowicz 2005:20), anger, alienation and dissatisfaction are mentioned in psychological grievances top on political and religious beliefs. Horgan (2008:84) discusses the presence of emotional vulnerability such as a feeling of anger, alienation, disenfranchisement which facilitate the participation of individual into radical violent movements.

This personality in Borum's description corresponds to the psychologically vulnerable person tending to violent extremism who shows some maladaptive cognitive and emotional patterns (Borum 2014). Is there an extremist mindset that can explain this cognitive and emotional pattern that can increase the violence tendency? Gambetta and Hertog's work on jihadi and right win extremist analyse the psyche and attitude of people involved in violence (Gambetta and Hertog 2016). This interesting study on disproportionate participation of engineers in Islamist extremism reveals some answer to the question whether the existence of mindset susceptible to certain types of extremism. Gérald Bronner studies the mental universe of terrorism perpetrators. He describes the phenomenon of radicalisation of minds based on numerous examples in social psychology in order to find an answer to the question in which circumstances we become extremist. He explains the extremism and radicalism with cognitive change and transformation. For others, this cognitive change is an important step in violent action. The process of radicalisation is conceived as a process of cognitive change and adaptation that leads to violence (Crone 2016: 604). The change of cognitive state of an individual is an explanatory factory of the emergence of violence (Moghaddam 2005). Many other sources follow this explanatory logic of this perspective aiming to understand the process of radicalisation. In addition to this cognitive change, at a more micro level, some researchers insist on the psychological dimension and fragilities turned into violent action. In the case of jihadi violence, Farhad Khosrokhavar stresses the mental fragility of the perpetrators in jail. According to Khosrokhavar, almost half of the people that he met suffer from psychological problems and neuroses accentuated by the deprivation of liberty (Khosrokhavar 2015: 158). In this fragility, to become a hero which is closely dependent on the self-esteemed coupled with the desire for recognition is also considered another

dynamic of the psychological factor of radicalisation. Thomas Lindemann proposes a sense of recognition claimed for us or our reference community in committing violence (Lindemann 2010:9). Oliver Roy also develops the argument that fragile identity of some western Muslims in which imagined Islamic heroism is idealised, and the western lifestyle is rejected; can be also the trigger of militarized jihad as a form of identity affirmation (Roy, 2004). In this sense, Fethi Benslama discusses the 'surmusulman' that pushes some Muslims to involve in jihadism in sheltering in a rigorist Islam and identity to reject the West and its values is a psychological invention (Benslama 2016:85). In line with Roy's and Benslama's arguments on fragile identity, Scott Atran sees violent extremism as a "... search of a social identity that give personal significance and glory" (in http://blogs.plos.org/neuroanthropology/2015/04/25).

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7- Root Causes and Multi-layered process

- The different case studies, individual stories, researches, and analysis demonstrate that it is difficult to have a general theory and idea that turn individuals into violent extremism or radicalism as they rely on multiple reasons and issues.
- Researches underly the socio-economic discrimination lead to political discrimination as a consequence push individual to engage in violence in order to challenge the existing situation.

Another way in which researchers sought to explain the radicalisation is a causal analysis of radicalism based on various factors. The social and economic dynamics that trigger the radicalism among some people are considered as main causes of violence and radicalisation such as economic deprivacy, early school dropout, social inequalities, unemployment, and personal crisis. The scholars identify the relationship between terrorism, violence, and root causes such as poverty, religion, regime type and ethnic divisions (Crenshaw 1981). Social and cultural distinctiveness of migrants, their discrimination, orientation problems for young Muslims contribute to the expansion of radical messages (Waldmann, Sirseloudi, Malthaner 2010).

These factors are often cited are some elements of root causes of radicalism which are linked with other ideological, psychological issues. First, the structural reasons of economic segregation can lead people to engage violently to challenge the existing situation. Precht explains these factors as background factors (2007:6). While the majority of researchers do not establish a direct link between

the socio-economic discrimination and violent radicalism, some argue that a group suffered by economic and social segregation are open and vulnerable to the violence (Piazza 2011:350). The economic problems led especially the vulnerable minority groups to the intention of applying violence effectively in order to voice to inequalities that they deal in daily life. This can be also the result of polarisation between 'majority' and 'minority' groups. James Goodwin points also out that violent extremism is the consequence of polarisation between groups (2006: 25). Another study follows the same argument to explain the role of economic frustration resulting in the political grievances in the emergence of extremism and radicalism among young British Muslims (O'Duffy 2008:40). In line with this argument, remarkable literature emphasizes on the particular conditions of Muslim communities in Europe that make vulnerable particularly Muslim youth to the violent interpretation of Islam (Khosrokhavar 2017, Roy 2004, Kepel 2004, Sageman 2008). Schmid discusses the vagueness of the background factors (2013: 2-3). The term of homegrown terrorism reflects what is appeared among Muslims in Europe. The Muslims who are socio-economically more disadvantaged, have non-qualified precarious jobs or unemployed with a low level of education and involved in criminality tend to express their dissatisfaction, anger with violent action. This particular social, cultural, and historical context, in Oliver Roy's explanation, is aligned with Islam that recast as an alternative identity for young Muslims who search an authentic and revanchist meaning for their feeling of exclusion (Roy 2004). This argument highlights the motivation of extremist and the narratives based on this discourse of exclusion justified by jihadis groups targeting Muslims who share the effect of stigmatisation and humiliation from the mainstream society. The collective attitude as sharing the same ethnic and religious identity reinforce the participation in violence (Bergen et all 2015). This stigmatisation consists also the

eviction of marginalised groups, minorities from political participation. Violence thus becomes a resource and mean in an attempt to enter the political fields and establish itself as a credible actor among traditional political ones. Individuals are willing to join a rebellion when they are marginalised from political decision making and alienated from politics. The eviction from the political process together with social and economic discrimination also contribute the radicalisation of people and their commitment to the violence.

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8- Ideology

- Recent articles on radicalisation and extremism focus on the nexus between cognitive radicalisation or ideological radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation. According to these studies, the cognitive change and transformation is the precursor of the behavioural radicalisation in which a person adopts a radical world view.
- The jihadist phenomenon depends first and foremost the cognitive turn and transformation leading violence.

In many types of research, the term radicalisation refers to a process of adoption of violent forms by individuals or groups linked to an extremist ideology (Borum 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens 2011; Wilner and Dubouloz 2010). In this reference, there is a link between radical ideology and violence. Is it possible to speak real conjunction between two? How is ideology translated into participation and collective mobilisation of violence? The first argument to the question of whether an ideology is the precursor of radicalisation that the ideology is not necessarily a precondition of it, but the violence can create a pathway to the radicalism. The perpetrators in recent terrorist attacks, Merah, Nemmouche, the Kouachi brothers, Coulibaly, the Danish-Jordan shooter Hamid El-Hussein and Paris shootings have been involved in various criminal activities in their early ages. Their experience with violence prepares their fast radicalisation (Crone 2016). This also explains the barriers of mass mobilisation in Muslim radicalism and why the only limited number of people get attracted by the radicalism can be explained by the concept of "recruitment of the toughest" (Hellmich 2010). After the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks, the idea that ideology is the main

denominator of the radicalisation process prevails on other explications. From radical preacher to online extremist, fundamentalism to radical Islam, the main focus remains on the ideological side of radicalisation.

Recent articles on radicalisation and extremism focus on the nexus between cognitive radicalisation or ideological radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation. According to these studies, the cognitive change and transformation is the precursor of the behavioural radicalisation in which a person adopts a radical world view. In this world view, ideologically, the violence is justified as a legal means. In line with the link between ideology and violence, the researchers also give attention to the global jihadist ideology that provides a framework for refusing Western life, thought (secularism and democracy) (Halverson and Way 2012). Silber and Bhatt's report focuses also on the main driver of Salafi jihadism aiming to analyse how people become radical and involve in violent actions (Silber and Bhatt 2007). Two different dimensions have an impact on the Muslim population receptivity to radicalisation: political and religious. Muslims who have an orthodox, very conservative understanding of Islam and who would like to see this Islam in public life by political means are vulnerable to the radicalisation. Another report on the study of homegrown jihadist terrorist in US and UK through the empirical examination arrives at the same conclusion that the religious ideology, the adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam viewing the West and Islam as opposed, manifesting a low tolerance for religious pluralism; impacts significantly the radicalisation process (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009). One of the examples of this world view is Salafi jihadism that is one of the very orthodox and very conservative ideology of Islam that advocates a brutal and revolutionary change, a global jihad as well as the defence of the Muslim community. This ideology

becomes the key tenant of violence that justifies individuals' participation in terrorist actions. The jihadi radical preachers exert a decisive influence on individuals at certain points. Gilles Kepel thinks that ideological radicalisation is an indispensable prerequisite for any form of violent radicalisation and Muslim extremism. The jihadist phenomenon depends first and foremost the cognitive turn and transformation leading violence. In contrast to this idea, other scholars like Farhad Khosrokhavar and Olivier Roy defends another argument that being familiar with violence leads to radicalisation (Khosrokhavar 2015). He gives the example of the November 2015 Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks. The perpetrators were already involved in criminality that facilitates their engagement with jihadi activism. Here, as suggested by Khosrokhavar, the gradual ideological radicalisation does not exist. Olivier Roy argues that Islamist terrorist and jihadi violence cannot be reduced to the Salafi literature and should be analysed independently from Salafi literature and practice (Chelly 2018). Randy Borum joined in this argument saying that the very idea of studying cognitive radicalisation is not sufficient condition for becoming terrorist (Borum 2011:8).

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9- De-Radicalisation and Prevention

- The CVE researches focus on three concepts: prevention, disengagement, and de-radicalisation with exit programs. The ongoing researches give more details about the variety of de-radicalisation and prevention methods, approaches, evaluations, and impacts.
- One of the crucial critical notes coming from these studies is that developing anti-radicalisation and prevention programs may victimise non-radical Muslims. CVE can be too general in its approach, in its definition of the problems. As a consequence, CVE programs may stigmatise a part of the community.
- According to the evaluation of de-radicalisation and prevention programs, one of the challenges for stakeholders stems from the "ill-definition" of radicalism and extremism which engenders the difficulty of well-defined de-radicalisation and prevention strategies. It is important to have a clear idea about what kind of radicalism the CVE is going to tackle.

Many western governments develop efforts and initiatives, support programs to respond radicalisation which is commonly referred to as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or simply prevention. There exist the introduction of new vocabulary: preventing violent extremism, countering violent extremism and preventing radicalization to violent extremism. The concept of CVE was introduced in academia and policymakers after the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks in response to tackle not only by security means but to have a broad perspective on counter-radicalisation. CVE measures and policies are aimed to support and develop programs from governmental and non-governmental organisations to counter various ideological stripes. For example,

the EU established the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012 under the Directorate-General Home Affairs. In the UK, prevention can be seen as the first CVE program established by the government (Heath-Kelly 2010, Arenes 2016). The primary focus is to create a network of people, organisations, people, projects with the goal of developing "frontline partnerships around the collation, creation, and dissemination of counter- and alternative-narratives through the Internet and social media" (RAN, 2012; Walker & Conway:169). The governments use different policies under CVE programs. The UK approach has manifested in a different way in prevention in order to reverse the radicalisation (Clutterbuck 2010). In the Netherlands, the Dutch authorities emphasise on monitoring Salafist trends and manifestations and the policies regarding approach the issue of counter-radicalisation (Bakker 2010). In general, the EU's counter-radicalisation strategy is based on various pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. This strategy is mainly used in British prevention approaches.

The literature on PVE and CVE has grown rapidly in many fields and disciplines, from psychiatry to criminology (Stephens et all. 2019). Each discipline with its specific framework and perspectives has its own approach through which prevention and de-radicalisation measures are addressed. For example, in social care, the focus is given to community engagement, while in psychology the individual micro-level is prioritised. Hence, the various approaches between disciplines and fields limit to find a coherent, shared policy on prevention and de-radicalisation. Stephens and all. reviewed seventy-three papers from different disciplines and key themes and concepts are noted for each paper. They arrived some common policies regarding prevention: the resilient individual, identity, dialogue and action, connected or resilient communities (2019: 3). The various approaches focus on different dimensions to prevent individuals and de-radicalise them through developing intellectual capacities, "facilitating an

individual's normal development pathway towards value pluralism" (Liht and Savage 2013: 47), critical thinking to assess ideas, sources (Ghosh et al. 2017) in order to provide individuals ideas, alternative messages. Ghosh et al analysed whether education can help counter violent religious extremism. The education intervention is considered an important tool eradicating radicalism and prevent people in engagement with it (Aly et al. 2014). In this regard, some researchers argue that the education of moral civic education and human rights notions foster an inclusive culture in a multicultural society with shared values (Davies 2016; Miller 2013). These studies suggest that human rights and civic education prepare young people to mind violent ideologies. Others like Feddes et al. propose that self-esteem and gaining self-confidence may also avoid individuals in joining violent extremism (Feddes et al. 2015). The aforementioned studies also highlight the role of dialogue and critical engagement with various ideologies including violent ones in obstructing the spread of violence. The dialogue may create some spaces of discussion in order to challenge and alter violent views. Another theme appears in the CVE literature is the community engagement with calls for working with resilient communities (Briggs 2010; Cherney and Hartley 2017; Ellis and Abdi 2017; Huq 2017; Lakhani 2011, Spalek and Weeks 2017; Weeks 2019). Lindekilde discusses the community coaching approach in Denmark which focuses on working not only with frontline partnerships at the same time with people in the community. The agenda of community work is based on three pillars: mentoring, counselling, and exit strategy. The community stakeholders work with security organisation, local authorities (2015:227).

The role of communities in preventing violence is finding its place in government policies aiming to develop community-based practices and initiatives. From 2005 onwards, the community-based approaches are developed, and many studies outline a number of practices of these approaches by analysing

the performance, the effectiveness, the problems and shortcoming occurred in the establishment of community engagement and resilience strategies. The prevention and community engagement programs are also criticised by various researchers, analysts as the government's agenda create confusion, stigmatisation, and distrust with Muslim communities (Thomas 2015).

In line with CVE, another concept appeared in research is de-radicalising those who have already participated in violent radical actions. De radicalisation as a type of intervention intended to 'normalise' those who engaged in jihadism and violent action. It is simply defined as dissociation from extremist beliefs. There exists a various type of de-radicalisation programs, initiatives led by government and communities. Omar Ashour's work scrutinizes in detail the cause of de-radicalisation of militant Islamists and jihadists in Egypt and Algeria (2009). He introduced three categorisations of de-radicalisation: ideological, behavioural, and organisational. For him, the ideological de-radicalisation is a process of disengagement from the core ideology promoting violence while accepting democratic rule, participating in political life. In the behavioural de-radicalisation, the individual leaves the violence and the use of armed methods. The last category refers to the process of dismantling the armed units of an Islamist and jihadi organisation. The proposed terminologies of disengagement and de-radicalisation are not very clear as Ashour's study does not clarify exactly why some radical Islamist groups quit from violent ideology, while other groups continue to use armed methods. For example, leaving or distancing with a radical group does not imply that the person has left the extremist beliefs. De-radicalisation and disengagement researches have been multiplied in recent years and proposed various ways of processes that lead to the exit. These processes can be a change related to individual beliefs, ideological returns,

progress in a political environment (Altier, Leonard Boyle, Shortland, & Horgan 2017; Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan 2014; Bjørgo 2009). The de-radicalisation and disengagement are used together in these studies and the difference between these terms remain blurred in programs and initiatives related exit programs.

The last point appeared in de-radicalisation and prevention studies is to determine the key indicators of interventions aimed at countering violent extremism which consists of another challenge of measuring effective policies and programs. In recent years, the researches shed light on these measures have been grown in academia (Baruch, Ling, Warnes, & Hofman 2018; El-Said 2015; Feddes & Gallucci 2015; Feddes et all. 2013; Gielen 2018; Helmus et al. 2017; Koehler 2017b; LaFree & Freilich 2019; Marsden, 2015; Romaniuk 2015; van Hemert et al. 2014). These studies also propose how to measure the impact of the de-radicalisation program and assessing the outcomes in an effective way through defining the key factors, however, these evaluations and assessments remain theoretical and data of de-radicalisation and prevention programs are not sufficiently investigated robustly which show how programs especially government-funded ones become effective or not.

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10-Recruitment and mobilisation

One of the central strands of radicalisation research is developed on recruitment methodologies, narratives and networks. Marc Sageman's seminal work on jihadist militancy and networks (2004; 2008) serves a good analysis of empirical research on jihadi radicalism. His studies provide not only methodological tools but also contribute to the theoretical dimension of radicalism studies. He uses a large dataset of individuals engaged in jihadism. Drawing from many sources such as reports, classified documents, Sageman refines his methodological approaches which become later a reference in jihadi radicalism. What he finds in his analysis, he highlights two complementary arguments. First, social ties, small cell groups, family, and friend networks play an important role in developing jihadi violence. In his sample, 75% of the engaged individuals know each other and their relations are based on existing small networks (2004:11). In addition to individual pathway, the radicalisation as the process includes the group engagement and involvement with strong bonds that generate the group mobilisation and dynamics which play an important role in transforming individuals to jihadi persons (2004: 155; 2008:86). In his other book, Leaderless Jihad (2008), he furthers on the analysis of friendships and deemphasises from a central hierarchical structure. Instead, he argues that the grassroots level operations and networks do not need the central support from al-Qaeda, so the recruitment is therefore born out of face-to-face interactions based on friendship. In line with this argument, IS empowers unaffiliated sympathisers at cyberspace for jihadism (Veilleux-Lepage 2016) which also witness the change of strategy of networking.

In this establishment of friendship, online recruitment takes place also (Berger 2015). Recruiters approach and interact with people by sharing sympathetic messages, surrounding them in like-minded people with their tweets, messages etc which proceeds the creation of a micro-community (Berger 2015:21).

Another scholar who uses the social movement methodology is Wiktorowicz. He departs from a case study from the qualitative analysis of the al-Muhajiroun group in the UK aiming to understand how people engage and join it. He argues that " ...affinity may predispose an individual to join a movement, but social ties are critical for transforming interest and availability into actual activism" (Wiktorowicz 2005:15). In his study, he highlights the role of social groups not only recruiting people but provides a social and religious context for those people. As a consequence of the socialisation, the individual gains an identity or transform his or her identity (Venhaus 2010).

A radicaliser who convert a normal person into a cause which ends up with violence is an important tool in the radicalisation process. Several radical preachers who disseminate radical opinions in public and online media are becoming the driving force behind this process (Wiktorowicz 2005, Alonso 2010). Wiktoriwicz identifies four steps in radicalisation pathway: a personal crisis linked with early droop out in school, involving in petty criminal activities, loss of a family member; a cognitive opening, and religious seeking (Wiktorowicz 2005: 20-24). Alonso explains how radical imams play a role in the radicalisation process through indoctrinating, proselytising and giving a subculture of death in Spain. In his study, watching videos and listening religious songs extolling the jihad, readings books and articles on bin Laden reinforce the death culture

among jihadis and mobilise them around the jihad cause (Alonso 2010: 210). The case of Spain shows that the process of radicalisation is led by charismatic figures such as the perpetrators of 11 March attacks, Mustapha Maymouni, Sarhana Ben Addelmajid.

Scott Atran (2003) highlights also the importance of socialisation in family and friendship groups. The candidates of suicide bombings gather through various events: football, paintball, camping, trekking, bodybuilding, social media forums and act later. These are leaderless groups and cellulose that are well structured and organised.

Senior activists, mentors, recruitment agents, online preachers play a role in the pathway of radicalisation (Bokhari et al 2006, Neumann and Rogers 2007:20, Precht 2007:60, Slootman and Tillie 2006:90). In Nesser's classification entrepreneurs; religiously devout people, misfits; loyal in cell groups, drifters; unconscious members have different roles in radicalisation (2018:12-17). Nowadays, an extremist influencer is in the spotlight in various milieus such as in prisons. Some research specific extremist milieus such as prisons in order to understand their role in the recruitment and radicalisation process. Farhad Khosrokhavar (2013), Fernando Reinares (2006) analysed this process in their works interviewing Muslim extremist prisoners arrested in French and Spanish context. Detainees in the prisons become much more vulnerable to extreme ideas and religiously violent ideologies (Neumann 2010:7). What is said about the prisons that extremist people groom young people and brainwash their minds? But it is not very clear what plays exactly in the radicalisation process in prisons: the authority, the prestige, religious credentials, activism and militancy. In the case of Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly, they met a radical influencer in prison.

Is it radical influencer's idea or life, experience affects these guys or theological guidance that they are seeking to push them into a violent path. In any case, the prisons are fertile ground to radicalise individuals and attract them to violence.

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